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Summary. This paper is concerned with n-person games which typically occur in
mathematical conict models [cf. [4], [7],[8]]. These games are so called cost-games,
in which every actor tries to minimize his own costs and the costs are interlinked
by a system of linear inequalities. It is shown that, if the players cooperate, i.e.,
minimize the sum of all the costs, they achieve a Nash Equilibrium. In order to
determine Nash Equilibria, the simplex method can be applied with respect to the
dual problem. An important special case is discussed and numerical examples are
presented.
1. Introduction
The conferences of Rio de Janeiro 1992 and Kyoto 1997 demand for new
economic instruments which have a focus on environmental protection in the
macro and micro economy. An important economic tool being part of the
treaty of Kyoto in that area is Joint-Implementation. It is an international
program being part of the treaty of Kyoto which intends to strenghten inter-
national cooperations between enterprises in order to reduce CO
2
-reductions.
A sustainable development can only be guaranteed if the instrument is em-
bedded in an optimal energy management. Optimal energy management ac-
cording to Joint-Implementation means in this context that it must work on
a micro level with minimal costs and it should be protected against misuse
on a macro level.
For that reason, the TEM model (Technology-Emissions-Means model) was
developed, giving the possibility to simulate such an extraordinary market
situation.
2. The TEM model
Technology-Emissions-Means model
The realization of Joint-Implementation (JI) is determined by technical and
nancial constraints. In a JI Program the reduced emissions resulting from
technical cooperations are registrated at the Clearing House. The TEMmodel
integrates both the simulation of the technical and nancial parameters. For
that reason we want to give a short introduction into the TEM model at
the beginning. In Pickl (1999) the TEM model is treated as a time-discrete
control problem. Furthermore, the analysis of the feasible set is examined in
Pickl (2000). In the following, after having introduced the TEM model we
want to present a new
GAME
The presented TEM-model describes the economical interaction between
several actors (players) which intend to maximize their emissions reduced (E
i
)
caused by technologies (T
i
) by means of expenditures of money (M
i
) or nan-
cial means, respectively. The index stands for the i-th player, i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
The players are linked by technical cooperations and the market, which
expresses itself in the nonlinear time-discrete dynamics of the Technology-
Emission-Means model, in short: TEM model.
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We want to explain in the following the TEM model. Let us begin with
a description of the following parameters. ( For a deeper insight see Pickl
(1999)):
E
i
emissions reduced of actor i in percent
M
i
nancial means of actor i
em
ij
eectivity measure parameter
describes the eect on the emissions of the i-th player
if the j-th actor invests money for his technologies
'
i
memory parameter

i
growth parameter
Here, em
ij
describes the eect on the emissions of the i-th actor, if the j-th
actor invests money. We can say that it expresses how eective technol-
ogy cooperations are (like an innovation factor), which is the central
element of a JI Program.
Furthermore, we are able to determine the em
ij
-parameter empirically.
In the rst equation the level of the reduced emissions at the t-th time-
step depends upon the last value plus a market eect. This eect expresses
itself in the additive terms which might be negative or positive. In general,
E
i
> 0 implies that the actors have reached yet the demanded value E
i
= 0
(normalized Kyoto-level). A value E
i
< 0 expresses that the emissions are
less than the requirements of the treaty. In the second equation we see that
for such a situation the nancial means will increase whereas E
i
> 0 leads to
a reduction of M
i
(t + 1):
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The second equation contains the logistic functional dependence and the
memory parameter '
i
which describes the eect of the preceeding investment
of nancial means. The dynamics does not guarantee, that the parameter
M
i
(t) lies in the interval, which can be regarded as a budget for the i-th actor.
For that reason we have to add restrictions to the dynamical representation.
0 M
i
(t) M

i
; i = 1; : : : ; n and t = 0; : : : ; N:
Then it is easy to show that
 
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M
i
(t)[M
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(t)]  0 for i = 1; : : : ; n and t = 0; : : : ; N:
We have guaranteed that M
i
(t + 1) increases if E
i
(t) + '
i
E
i
(t)  0 and
decreases if E
i
(t) + '
i
E
i
(t)  0. Applying the memory parameter '
i
we
have developed a reasonable model for the money expenditure - emission -
interaction, where the inuence of the technologies is integrated in the em-
matrix of the system.
We can use the TEM model as a time-discrete model where we start with
a special parameter set and observe the resulting trajectories. Normally, the
actors start with a negative value, i.e., they lie under the baseline mentioned
in Kyoto Protocol, see Kyoto (1997). They try to reach a positive value of
E
i
. If we add control parameters, we enforce this development by an additive
nancial term. For that reason the control parameter are added only to the
second equation.
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In the sense of environmental protection, the aim is to reach a state which
is mentioned in the treaty of Kyoto by choosing the control parameters such
that the emissions of each player become minimized. The focal point is the
realization of the necessary optimal control parameters via a played cost
game, which is determined by the way of cooperation of the actors.
3. The Cost-Game in the TEM Model
If we regard the nonlinear time-discrete dynamics of the TEM-model
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we can also formulate
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In order to reach steady states, which are determined in Pickl (1999), an
independent institution may inuence the trade relations between the actors.
In practice, the imposing of taxes or the giving of incentives means that in the
TEM-model the em-parameter will change. Now, the principle of JI implies
that technical cooperation will be benetted:
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According to ( 1) and ( 2) let us begin with the construction of the cost-
game in the TEM-model
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In the sequel, we have
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For the time-dependent grand coalition we get:
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M
i
(t)  0 (i; j 2 f1; : : : ; ng) the dierence between the co-
operative and the non-cooperative case is always positive. So we have con-
structed a reasonable cost-game. Now we want to steer the system in a cost-
minimal way in order to reach the states M
i
(
^
t) = 0 and E
i
(
^
t) = 0 (i =
1; : : : ; n), for some
^
t  0.
The method is that at each time step, the amount of our cost-game is
put into a central fund, which can also be used as feasible set for our control
process. In the following we want to analyse a special allocation principle.
This minimization problem leads directly to the following allocation prob-
lem which we will solve in the next section. Using linear programming tech-
niques and the simplex method Nash Equilibria are determined. Together
with the basic theory [5] then we are able to simulate and analyse an eco-
nomical Joint-Implementation Program [7] with the TEM model in the sense
of Gustav Feichtinger [2], [3].
4. The Allocation Problem
In connection with the TEM-Model [7] which is based on a general conict
model [6] the following allocation problem is in the center of interest. In
order to develop a Joint-ImplementationProgram we begin with the following
formulation:
Given n players who pursue n goals which are given by an n-vector
b = (b
1
; : : : ; b
n
)
T
with b
i
 0 for i = 1; : : : ; n:
In order to achieve these goals every player has to put in a certain amount
of money, say x
i
 0 for the i-th player. The share of the player j at the goal
b
i
(where b
j
is his own goal) when he spends one unit is assumed to be c
ij
where (for good reasons)
c
ii
> 0 for i = 1; : : : ; n . (4)
If i 6= j, however, c
ij
 0 is also allowed for. In such a case player j can
be considered as an opponent of player i. The requirement to achieve all the
goals is expressed by the following system of linear inequalities
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In the sequel we assume that there is a vector x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
n
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i
 0
for i = 1; : : : ; n for which the inequalities (2) are satised.
Then, for every i, the i-th player, of course, is interested in minimizing his
own contribution x
i
. In general, this will not be possible simultaneously. So
the players will have to cooperate. Let us assume that they choose x^ 2 IR
n
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j
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for x = x^, is as small as possible. Now let, for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, x
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which implies that x^ is a Nash equilibrium.
5. On the Determination of Nash-Equilibria
The problem of minimizing (3) subject to (2) and
x
j
 0 for j = 1; : : : ; n (9)
is a typical problem of linear programming whose dual problem consists of
maximizing
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If we put y
i
= 0 for i = 1; : : : ; n, then we obtain a solution of (11) and (12).
Under the above assumption that there exists a solution of (5) and (7) we can
apply a well known duality theorem and conclude that there exists a solution
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On introducing slack variables
z
j
 0 for j = 1; : : : ; n (14)
the inequalities (11) can be rewritten as equations in the form
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The dual problem is then equivalent to the minimization of
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subject to (12), (14), and (15). This problem can be solved immediately by
the simplex method starting with the basic solution
z
j
= 1 for j = 1; : : : ; n and y
i
= 0 for i = 1; : : : ; n . (17)
5.1 A Special Case
Now let us assume that for some j 2 f1; : : : ; ng it is true that
c
ij
 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n , i 6= j , (18)
i.e., the player j can be considered as an opponent of all the other players. If
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is a solution of (5) and (9) that minimizes (6), it follows that
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Now let us assume that
c
ij
 0 for all i 6= j , (20)
i.e. all players can be considered as opponents to each other. Then, for every
solution x^ 2 IR
n
of (5) and (9) that minimizes (6), it follows that
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If we assume (20) and
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ed and the matrix C is inverse monotone, i.e., the inverse
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This means that, if all players oppose each other but every player's contribu-
tion to achieving his own goal is larger than the negative sum of his opponents,
then everybody can reach an absolutely minimal amount of money.
6. Inverse Monotony
Let C be inverse monotone and let C

 C. If x 2 IR
n
is a solution of (5)
and (7), then x also solves
C

x  b (1)
and, if x

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
 x^. The last considerations can be interpreted as follows:
If C is inverse monotone, then the players can achieve the best possible
individual results by solving the linear system
C x^ = b .
If they replace C by a matrixC

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with (9) and (2), then x
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 x^, i.e., every player gets a better result x

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is a Nash equilibrium.
6.1 The General Case
We assume that there is a solution of (4) and (5) which implies that the dual
problem has a solution. If this is obtained by r  n steps of the simplex
method, the result can be assumed to be of the following form
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The solution of the dual problem reads y^
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All this implies that
x^
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for j = 1; : : : ; r ,
x^
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= 0 for j = r + 1; : : : ; n
minimizes s(x) subject to (4) and (5).
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